Military Experts at “Defending Baltics”: NATO Countries Should Not Replace Conventional Capabilities with Drones

Military experts participating in the international security and defence conference “Defending Baltics” in Vilnius stated that NATO countries should not replace conventional intelligence and long-range strike capabilities (“deep strike” of 300 km and beyond) with drones, even though their use has proven highly effective on the Ukrainian front. According to defence and security experts, drone capabilities should reinforce traditional means and expand their effectiveness in a military conflict.

The “Defending Baltics” conference brought together over 500 security, defence, and military experts, diplomats, and politicians. The event was attended by the Chiefs of Defence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, as well as defence experts from Poland, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Discussing the defence of the Baltic region, participants emphasized the need to see the bigger picture. The Arctic, the North Atlantic, and Western Europe are not only the hinterland or sea, air, and land routes to our region - the Baltic states - but also routes out of it, from East to West. Therefore, as questions arise regarding transatlantic unity, new political, diplomatic, economic, and military opportunities emerge to seek common ground and joint solutions.

Experts highlighted that the Baltic Sea is arguably the only realistic route for supplying forces on NATO’s eastern flank and for enabling allies to arrive during a military conflict. For this reason, Russia began hybrid operations in this region (including the Baltic Sea itself) several years ago, attempting to shape the potential area of operations to its advantage. The Western response cannot be limited to military measures alone - political and infrastructural decisions from NATO and the EU are required. Unfortunately, these decisions are lagging.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has shown that a potential adversary is capable of adapting. Its adaptation focuses primarily on cheap and rapidly deployable solutions (drones, guided aerial bombs, weapons supplied by North Korea, etc.). In this way, although Russia continues to lag technologically behind the West, such solutions enable it to wage a war of attrition - one for which the aggressor still has resources and motivation.

It should be noted that a NATO-Russia war would likely differ from what we are witnessing in Ukraine. For example, the Allies possess significantly more advanced intelligence and long-range strike capabilities, both in quality and quantity. These capabilities have the potential to address Russia’s A2/AD (“anti-access/area-denial”) “bubble” problem in the Baltic region (Kaliningrad and Saint Petersburg), thus enabling Allied logistics and the arrival of forces not only by sea but also - at least to some extent - by land and air. Therefore, NATO countries should not replace their conventional intelligence and deep-strike capabilities with drones that have proven effective for Ukrainians. Instead, they should use drones to strengthen conventional means and expand their operational possibilities.

Meanwhile, for the smaller states of the Baltic region, the Ukrainian experience is critically important. Based on this experience, countries in the region could develop intelligence and deep-strike capabilities that are not as costly as high-end technological weapons, yet would still allow the targeting of enemy assets at distances of at least 300 km. To achieve this, drone capabilities must be developed not merely as individual tools but as a “system of systems”—integrated into broader processes of combat training, interoperability, and adaptation.

In this context, cooperation between the armed forces and the defence industry is crucial. Purchasing equipment “off the shelf” not only burdens supply chains but also prevents forces from adapting operationally. The path NATO should pursue - and is pursuing - is technical-level cooperation, where concrete operational requirements are jointly formulated so that manufacturers can meet them, ensuring that our forces can dominate the battlefield.

These and other insights will be further presented to the public this year in a separate document prepared by the organisers of “Defending Baltics”, which will also outline practical recommendations for strengthening the defence architecture of the Baltic region.

The Defending Baltics 2025 international conference was organised by the civic defence and security analysis centre “Locked N’ Loaded”, and the “Civil Resilience Initiative”. The two-day event is held in cooperation with the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, the European Commission, the Embassy of the Kingdom of Norway in Lithuania, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, and the Vilnius City Municipality. “Defending Baltics 2025” is also supported by Maxima Group, LTMilTech, Bankera, Euroelektronika, Intelic, Patria, Hyundai Naval & Special Ship Business Unit, and Brolis Defence Group.

Video of keynote speech of Andrius Kubilius, European Commissioner for Defence and Space: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NDwY1DgtJCM

Video of panel discussion “Closest to the Enemy – the NATO Eastern Flank”, Chiefs of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia Defence: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EJcVg0UmhAY